In this talk I will present a stochastic model for the excitability of a neuron in a network. The neuron described by an Hodgkin-Huxley type model receives from the network a random input which is a perturbation of a periodic deterministic signal. For such a model we study ergodicity properties. Then, we prove limit theorems in order to be able to estimate characteristics of the sequence of spiking times. This talk is based on a joint work with R. Hoepfner (Univ. Mainz) and E. Loecherbach (Univ. Cergy-Pontoise).

Hodgkin-Huxley model - ergodicity - limit theorems - estimation[-]

A popular line of research in evolutionary biology is to use time-calibrated phylogenies in order to infer the underlying diversification process. This involves the use of stochastic models of ultrametric trees, i.e., trees whose tips lie at the same distance from the root. We recast some well-known models of ultrametric trees (infinite regular trees, exchangeable coalescents, coalescent point processes) in the framework of so-called comb metric spaces and give some applications of coalescent point processes to the phylogeny of bird species.

However, these models of diversification assume that species are exchangeable particles, and this always leads to the same (Yule) tree shape in distribution. Here, we propose a non-exchangeable, individual-based, point mutation model of diversification, where interspecific pairwise competition is only felt from the part of individuals belonging to younger species. As the initial (meta)population size grows to infinity, the properly rescaled dynamics of species lineages converge to a one-parameter family of coalescent trees interpolating between the caterpillar tree and the Kingman coalescent.

Keywords: ultrametric tree, inference, phylogenetic tree, phylogeny, birth-death process, population dynamics, evolution[-]

Horizontal transfer of information is recognized as a major process in the evolution and adaptation of population, especially micro-organisms. There is a large literature but the previous models are either based on epidemiological models or population genetics stochastic models with constant population size. We propose a general stochastic eco-evolutionary model of population dynamics with horizontal and vertical transfers, inspired by the transfer of plasmids in bacteria. The transfer rates are either density-dependent (DD) or frequency-dependent (FD) or of Michaelis-Menten form (MM). Our model allows eco-evolutionary feedbacks. In the first part we present a two-traits (alleles or kinds of plasmids, etc.) model with horizontal transfer without mutation and study a large population limit. It's a ODEs system. We show that the phase diagrams are different in the (DD), (FD) and (MM) cases. We interpret the results for the impact of horizontal transfer on the maintenance of polymorphism and the invasion or elimination of pathogens strains. We also propose a diffusive approximation of adaptation with transfer. In a second part, we study the impact of the horizontal transfer on the evolution. We explain why it can drastically affect the evolutionary outcomes. Joint work with S. Billiard,P. Collet, R. Ferrière, C.V. Tran.[-]

Maladapted individuals can only colonise a new habitat if they can evolve a positive growth rate fast enough to avoid extinction - evolutionary rescue. We use the infinitesimal model to follow the evolution of the growth rate, and find that the probability that a single migrant can establish depends on just two parameters: the mean and genetic variance of fitness. With continued migration, establishment is inevitable. However, above a threshold migration rate, the population may be trapped in a sink state, in which adaptation is held back by gene flow. By assuming a constant genetic variance, we develop a diffusion approximation for the joint distribution of population size and trait mean.[-]

A new type of a simple iterated game with natural biological motivation is introduced. Two individuals are chosen at random from a population. They must survive a certain number of steps. They start together, but if one of them dies the other one tries to survive on its own. The only payoff is to survive the game. We only allow two strategies: cooperators help the other individual, while defectors do not. There is no strategic complexity. There are no conditional strategies. Depending on the number of steps we recover various forms of stringent and relaxed cooperative dilemmas. We derive conditions for the evolution of cooperation.
Specifically, we describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. Expected payoffs are probabilities of survival. A key feature of the game is that individuals have to survive on their own if their partner dies. We consider individuals with simple, unconditional strategies. When both players are present, each step is a symmetric two-player game. As the number of iterations tends to infinity, all probabilities of survival decrease to zero. We obtain general, analytical results for n-step payoffs and use these to describe how the game changes as n increases. In order to predict changes in the frequency of a cooperative strategy over time, we embed the survival game in three different models of a large, well-mixed population. Two of these models are deterministic and one is stochastic. Offspring receive their parent's type without modification and fitnesses are determined by the game. Increasing the number of iterations changes the prospects for cooperation. All models become neutral in the limit $(n \rightarrow \infty)$. Further, if pairs of cooperative individuals survive together with high probability, specifically higher than for any other pair and for either type when it is alone, then cooperation becomes favored if the number of iterations is large enough. This holds regardless of the structure of pairwise interactions in a single step. Even if the single-step interaction is a Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperative type becomes favored. Enhanced survival is crucial in these iterated evolutionary games: if players in pairs start the game with a fitness deficit relative to lone individuals, the prospects for cooperation can become even worse than in the case of a single-step game.[-]

A phylogenetic tree that has been reconstructed from a given gene can describe a different evolutionary history from its underlying species tree. The reasons for this include: error in inferring the gene tree, incomplete lineage sorting, lateral gene transfer, and the absence of the gene in certain species. In this talk, I discuss probabilistic models and mathematical results that help address basic questions concerning the consistency and efficiency of different methods for inferring a species phylogeny from gene trees.[-]

In this presentation, we shall discuss the reconstruction of demographic parameters based on the genetic variability observed within a sample of individual DNA. In the family of models that we consider, the statistics describing this genetic diversity (number of mutations, distribution of the mutations amongst individuals in the sample) depend on a more or less coarse ‘resolution of (i.e., level of information on) the hidden genealogical tree that relates the sampled individuals. Considering the optimal resolution thus allows to greatly improve the exploration of the space of possible genealogies when computing the likelihood of demographic parameters, compared to classical methods based on full labelled trees such as Kingmans coalescent. We shall focus on two examples, based on works with Raazesh Sainudiin (Uppsala Univ.) and with Julia Palacios (Stanford Univ.), Sohini Ramachandran (Brown Univ.) and John Wakeley (Harvard Univ.).[-]