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The evolution of cooperation in an iterated survival game
Post-edited
Authors : Wakeley, John (Author of the conference)
CIRM (Publisher )
91A12 - Cooperative games
91A20 - Multistage and repeated games
91A40 - Game-theoretic models
91A80 - Applications of game theory
92D15 - Problems related to evolution
91A22 - Evolutionary games
Additional resources :
https://www.cirm-math.fr/ProgWeebly/Renc1774/Wakeley.pdf
CIRM (Publisher )
Abstract :
A new type of a simple iterated game with natural biological motivation is introduced. Two individuals are chosen at random from a population. They must survive a certain number of steps. They start together, but if one of them dies the other one tries to survive on its own. The only payoff is to survive the game. We only allow two strategies: cooperators help the other individual, while defectors do not. There is no strategic complexity. There are no conditional strategies. Depending on the number of steps we recover various forms of stringent and relaxed cooperative dilemmas. We derive conditions for the evolution of cooperation.
Specifically, we describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. Expected payoffs are probabilities of survival. A key feature of the game is that individuals have to survive on their own if their partner dies. We consider individuals with simple, unconditional strategies. When both players are present, each step is a symmetric two-player game. As the number of iterations tends to infinity, all probabilities of survival decrease to zero. We obtain general, analytical results for n-step payoffs and use these to describe how the game changes as n increases. In order to predict changes in the frequency of a cooperative strategy over time, we embed the survival game in three different models of a large, well-mixed population. Two of these models are deterministic and one is stochastic. Offspring receive their parent's type without modification and fitnesses are determined by the game. Increasing the number of iterations changes the prospects for cooperation. All models become neutral in the limit $(n \rightarrow \infty)$. Further, if pairs of cooperative individuals survive together with high probability, specifically higher than for any other pair and for either type when it is alone, then cooperation becomes favored if the number of iterations is large enough. This holds regardless of the structure of pairwise interactions in a single step. Even if the single-step interaction is a Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperative type becomes favored. Enhanced survival is crucial in these iterated evolutionary games: if players in pairs start the game with a fitness deficit relative to lone individuals, the prospects for cooperation can become even worse than in the case of a single-step game.
MSC Codes : Specifically, we describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. Expected payoffs are probabilities of survival. A key feature of the game is that individuals have to survive on their own if their partner dies. We consider individuals with simple, unconditional strategies. When both players are present, each step is a symmetric two-player game. As the number of iterations tends to infinity, all probabilities of survival decrease to zero. We obtain general, analytical results for n-step payoffs and use these to describe how the game changes as n increases. In order to predict changes in the frequency of a cooperative strategy over time, we embed the survival game in three different models of a large, well-mixed population. Two of these models are deterministic and one is stochastic. Offspring receive their parent's type without modification and fitnesses are determined by the game. Increasing the number of iterations changes the prospects for cooperation. All models become neutral in the limit $(n \rightarrow \infty)$. Further, if pairs of cooperative individuals survive together with high probability, specifically higher than for any other pair and for either type when it is alone, then cooperation becomes favored if the number of iterations is large enough. This holds regardless of the structure of pairwise interactions in a single step. Even if the single-step interaction is a Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperative type becomes favored. Enhanced survival is crucial in these iterated evolutionary games: if players in pairs start the game with a fitness deficit relative to lone individuals, the prospects for cooperation can become even worse than in the case of a single-step game.
91A12 - Cooperative games
91A20 - Multistage and repeated games
91A40 - Game-theoretic models
91A80 - Applications of game theory
92D15 - Problems related to evolution
91A22 - Evolutionary games
Additional resources :
https://www.cirm-math.fr/ProgWeebly/Renc1774/Wakeley.pdf
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Information on the Video
Film maker : Hennenfent, GuillaumeLanguage : English Available date : 10/07/2018 Conference Date : 27/06/2018 Subseries : Research talks arXiv category : Quantitative Biology Mathematical Area(s) : Mathematics in Science & Technology ; Probability & Statistics Format : MP4 (.mp4) - HD Video Time : 00:48:31 Targeted Audience : Researchers Download : https://videos.cirm-math.fr/2018-06-27_Wakeley.mp4 
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Information on the Event
Event Title : Probability and biological evolution / Probabilités et évolution biologiqueEvent Organizers : Pardoux, Etienne ; Wakolbinger, Anton Dates : 25/06/2018 - 29/06/2018 Event Year : 2018 Event URL : https://conferences.cirm-math.fr/1774.html
Citation Data
DOI : 10.24350/CIRM.V.19418303Cite this video as: Wakeley, John (2018). The evolution of cooperation in an iterated survival game. CIRM. Audiovisual resource. doi:10.24350/CIRM.V.19418303 URI : http://dx.doi.org/10.24350/CIRM.V.19418303 |
See Also
- [Multi angle] How to make good resolutions / Author of the conference Véber, Amandine.
- [Multi angle] Deciphering a species phylogeny from conflicting gene trees / Author of the conference Steel, Michael Anthony.
- [Multi angle] Establishment in a new habitat under the infinitesimal model / Author of the conference Barton, Nicholas H. ; Author of the conference Etheridge, Alison M..
Bibliography
